

Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation Amendment Bill

Government Bill

As reported from the Justice Committee

Commentary

Recommendation

The Justice Committee has examined the Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation Amendment Bill and recommends by majority that it be passed. We recommend all amendments by majority.

About the bill as introduced

The bill is an omnibus bill that would amend the Constitution Act 1986 and the Electoral Act 1993. Under Standing Order 267(1)(a), an omnibus bill may be introduced to amend more than one Act if the amendments deal with an interrelated topic that can be regarded as implementing a single broad policy.

The single broad policy that would be implemented by the bill is to provide an option to extend, in specified circumstances, the maximum term of a Parliament to 4 years. At present, section 17(1) of the Constitution Act provides that Parliament can run no longer than 3 years after the date fixed for the return of the writ for the preceding general election. A general election must be held once the term has ended.

By providing an option at the start of a parliamentary term to extend the maximum term of Parliament to 4 years, the bill aims to improve law making as more time would be available to develop and progress well-tested policy and legislation.

The standard maximum term of a Parliament would remain at 3 years. The option to extend it to 4 years would be available if the composition of subject select committee membership was used to strengthen checks and balances on the Government. At present, the overall membership of subject select committees must, so far as reasonably practicable, be proportional to party membership in the House.¹ Under the bill, if their overall membership was instead proportional to the non-executive membership

of the House, the maximum term could be extended to 4 years. The bill defines a “non-executive member” as “a member of Parliament who is not a Minister or Parliamentary Under-Secretary”.

The Governor-General, on the advice of the Prime Minister, would need to issue a Proclamation declaring that the term of Parliament is 4 years. The Governor-General could only issue the Proclamation if the House had passed a resolution within 3 months after the day that Parliament first met confirming that the proportionality requirement had been satisfied. We understand that this condition is intended to enhance the accountability and scrutiny of Government by allowing opposition parties more influence in subject select committees. It would typically, but not always, result in subject select committees with opposition majorities.

The main provisions in the bill would only come into effect after a referendum if the majority of electors supported the change. The Referendums Framework Bill, which we considered alongside this bill, provides for the conduct of referendums to be held in conjunction with either of the next 2 general elections. We encourage people to read our report to the House on that bill.

Legislative scrutiny

As part of our consideration of the bill, we have examined its consistency with principles of legislative quality. We have no issues regarding the legislation’s design to bring to the attention of the House.

Overview of our commentary

We propose fundamental amendment of the bill. In effect, the provisions in clause 5 of the bill as introduced would create a variable term of Parliament, which we do not support. Instead, we propose amending the bill to provide for a maximum 4-year term, subject to a referendum, and to remove the provisions related to select committees. This commentary sets out our rationale for this view, our proposed amendments, and other matters that we wish to highlight to the House.

Variable term of Parliament

Many submitters expressed concern about the concept of a variable term of Parliament. Their concerns included that it would cause instability, uncertainty, and confusion for voters, who would not know how long they were electing their representatives for. A variable term could also create practical challenges, including if the parliamentary elections and local government elections sometimes coincided. It would also create uncertainty for other settings connected to the parliamentary term, such as some electoral laws or those related to public sector reporting obligations.

We share submitters’ concerns about a variable term. We note that the maximum term could fluctuate from election to election. Consequently, voters would not have long-

¹ Standing Order 186(1)

term certainty as to how often they could hold the Government to account. This could result in them struggling to make an informed choice at elections or becoming less engaged in the democratic process. A variable term would risk creating uncertainty for the public, local government, businesses, and communities regarding the frequency of changes to government policy. We discuss our views about the alignment with the local government term in more detail later in this commentary.

Proportionality requirement for select committees

Clause 5 of the bill as introduced would add new section 17(4) to the Constitution Act, setting out the proposed new proportionality requirement for select committees. The requirement would be met if the overall membership of the subject select committees was proportional to the party membership in the House of the non-executive members.

A number of submitters opposed the proportionality requirement. Their reasons included the potential for it to be manipulated or bypassed, or for select committee proceedings to be inhibited. Some submitters pointed out that the bill would not require the proportionality requirement to be met for the duration of the term. Therefore, membership could be altered after the 4-year term was declared. Others suggested that the House could ignore or reject select committee recommendations at later stages or use urgency to completely bypass select committees.

We note that a longstanding feature of New Zealand's constitutional arrangements is that Parliament determines its own procedures and practices. The *Standing Orders of the House of Representatives* set out the rules of procedure for the House and its committees. The Standing Orders Committee is empowered to review the Standing Orders, procedures, and practices of the House and to manage changes to Standing Orders. It typically undertakes a review every three years at the end of a parliamentary term but can initiate reform of the Standing Orders at any time.

Several submitters were concerned that the proportionality requirement would infringe on the right of the House to determine its own proceedings. The Clerk of the House of Representatives observed that the bill would specify aspects of the House's rules and practice in legislation, limiting its ability to determine these matters for itself. He stated that legislation should not constrain the House's future consideration of its committee system. Further, if parliamentary rules were set in statute, legislative amendments would be needed to change them.

We were informed of several examples of House procedures being included in legislation in New Zealand. Instances where House workings have been included in statute tend to be for ancillary or day-to-day matters such as the operation of the parliamentary workplace and determination of members' remuneration and expense claims. Other examples include the Parliamentary Privileges Act 2014 and the Epidemic Preparedness Act 2006. For select committee proceedings, the Standing Orders have tended to prescribe conduct sparingly, which generally leaves them to regulate themselves. We also received advice that it is hard to make direct international comparisons given the significant differences between countries' constitutional processes and

political arrangements. However, most Westminster parliamentary systems are governed through Standing Orders. The exceptions are some specific and temporary committees that are provided for in statute.

We acknowledge that the proportionality requirement for select committees is intended to improve the checks and balances on the Government. However, linking their membership to the term of Parliament in primary legislation appears to encroach on the right of the House to control its own procedures and processes. Submitters have also highlighted some potential practical challenges that could make the requirement difficult to implement and could result in unintended consequences.

Our proposal for a maximum 4-year term

Given the concerns set out above, we discussed several options to amend the bill. Standing Order 300(1) states that committees may only recommend amendments that are relevant to the subject matter of the bill, are consistent with the principles and objects of the bill, and otherwise confirm to the Standing Orders and the practices of the House.

We sought advice from the Office of the Clerk on whether several amendments to the bill were admissible, including:

- removing the proportionality requirement for select committees so that the effect of the bill would be a direct change to a 4-year term
- removing the provisions that would change the term of Parliament so that the effect of the bill would only be the changes to the proportionality requirement.

We note that the bill is an omnibus bill with the single broad policy of providing an option to extend the term of Parliament to 4 years in certain circumstances. We were advised that the first proposal would be within the scope of the bill because it is consistent with the bill's overall policy of enabling a 4-year term. The second proposal would not be in scope because it would be inconsistent with the principles and objects of the bill. Removing the provisions that enable the extension of the term would be contrary to the bill's purpose.

On reflection, we consider that the bill should be amended to provide for a maximum 4-year term of Parliament. We do not have a view on whether a 3- or 4-year term is preferable and propose that the change should be subject to a referendum.

We also recommend removing the select committee proportionality requirement. We note that submitters provided suggestions of other potential checks and balances that Parliament could implement, including recommendations to reform select committee processes. Several submitters endorsed a package of procedural reforms to improve the accountability and scrutiny of the Government. They suggested that the Standing Orders Committee, which operates on the basis of unanimity, should be responsible for implementing the reforms. We recommend that the Standing Orders Committee consider the relevant submissions on this bill and implement improvements related to parliamentary processes, including select committees.

Proposed amendments

The rest of this commentary covers the main amendments we recommend to the bill as introduced to implement a maximum 4-year term of Parliament. We do not discuss minor or technical amendments.

Maximum 4-year term of Parliament

Section 17(1) of the Constitution Act provides that Parliament's term, unless sooner dissolved, shall be no longer than 3 years from the day fixed for the return of the writs issued for the last preceding general election. We recommend amending section 17(1) by replacing the reference to "3" years with "4".

Clause 5(2) of the bill, which would replace section 17(2) of the Constitution Act, contains the variable term and select committee proportionality settings. In light of our decision not to support a variable term, we recommend deleting clause 5(2).

Entrenchment of certain provisions

Part 2 of the bill would amend the Electoral Act. Section 268 of the Electoral Act sets out six "reserved provisions", which are also known as "entrenched provisions". These provisions cannot be repealed or amended unless passed by a 75 percent majority of the House or carried by a majority of votes in a national referendum. Section 268(1)(a) provides that the term of Parliament is entrenched through a cross-reference to section 17(1) of the Constitution Act.

Clause 8 of the bill as introduced would replace section 268(1)(a) of the Electoral Act to also entrench the following provisions:

- section 17(2) of the Constitution Act, so far as it relates to 4 years for a term of Parliament
- section 17(4) of the Constitution Act, relating to the proportionality requirement for a 4-year term.

We recommend deleting clause 8. These entrenchment provisions would no longer be needed if the House accepts our recommendation to delete clause 5(2) with its provision for a variable 4-year term (section 17(2)) and proportionality requirements (section 17(4)). We note that the term of Parliament would continue to be entrenched through the existing reference to section 17(1) of the Constitution Act.

Title of the bill

We understand that the current title of the bill is intended to reflect the concept of a variable term and the naming conventions for omnibus bills. However, our proposed recommendation to implement a maximum 4-year term would effectively change the bill from an omnibus bill to an amendment bill. As amended, the bill would amend the Constitution Act, with a minor consequential amendment to the Electoral Act. Therefore, we recommend amending the title of the bill to "Constitution (4-year Term of Parliament) Amendment Bill". We think this title provides sufficient clarity about the specific change that the bill is progressing.

Commencement

Clause 2 sets out when the bill's provisions would come into force. This would be linked to the holding of a referendum. The main amendments would come into force if the results of the referendum declared that a majority of electors supported a change to a 4-year term. In this case, clause 2(2) specifies that most provisions in the bill would come into force on the day that the writ was issued for the first general election following the referendum results.

We consider that the bill as introduced is unclear as to what constitutes a majority of electors. For example, it could be interpreted as requiring either a majority of those enrolled to vote or those who actually voted in a referendum. We understand that it is intended to refer to electors who vote in a referendum. We recommend amending clause 2(2) to make this intent clear. Under our proposed amendment, the support needed for the bill's changes to come into force would be the majority of electors voting in a referendum. This is also consistent with section 268(2)(b) of the Electoral Act, which sets out that changing an entrenched provision via a referendum requires a simple majority of the valid votes cast.

Referendum question

Clause 2(2) of the bill as introduced specifies that most provisions would come into force only if the majority of electors in a referendum responded to the question specified in subsection (3) with the affirmative option specified in subsection (4). Clause 2(3) provides the wording of the question to be put to electors in the referendum. Clause 2(4) sets out the two options for voters to respond to that question.

Because we do not support the variable term proposed in the bill as introduced, we propose amending the referendum question and options. We propose that electors be given the choice between retaining the current 3-year maximum term of Parliament or changing to a 4-year maximum. We would like to emphasise that it needs to be explicitly clear to electors what they are voting for.

We received advice on how to appropriately frame the referendum question and options. We considered several choices and recommend amending clause 2(3) to specify that the question would be "Which option do you vote for?", and amending clause 2(4) to provide the following options:

- I vote to keep the maximum term of Parliament at 3 years.
- I vote to change the maximum term of Parliament to 4 years.²

Definition of "default day" in the Electoral Act

Section 3B of the Electoral Act deals with the "regulated period" in relation to a general election. Section 3B(5) defines the "default day" as "the day that is 2 years

² The other options that we considered are on page 23 of the Ministry of Justice's departmental report, which is published on the Parliament website.

and 9 months after the polling day for the preceding general election”. Clause 7 of the bill as introduced would replace the definition of “default day” in section 3B with one that recognises that the term of a Parliament could be 3 or 4 years. As we are proposing a maximum term of 4 years, we recommend amending the definition in section 3B(5) by replacing the reference to “2 years and 9 months” with “3 years and 9 months”. This change would only come into force if the main change to the 4-year term was supported in a referendum.

Other matters considered

During our consideration of the bill we also spent some time discussing several other matters. Although they have not resulted in recommended amendments, we consider that they should be brought to the attention of the House.

Alignment with local government

A number of submitters commented on the effect of the bill on local government. Local government election dates are fixed in legislation as every three years. Although they are intended never to coincide with the general election, it is theoretically possible because the parliamentary election date is not fixed.

Many submitters considered that a 4-year term of Parliament should be replicated in local government, and that not making the change simultaneously would have significant democratic and practical implications. All but 1 of the 17 councils that submitted explicitly recommended that local government should move to a 4-year term if Parliament did. Reasons for supporting synchronisation included preventing disruption to long-term planning and budgeting processes and enhancing collaboration between central and local government. Submitters were also concerned that a variable term could increase the likelihood of general and local elections coinciding. This could result in administrative challenges, voter confusion, and local issues being overshadowed.

We sought advice on whether the bill could be amended to also apply a 4-year term to local government. We were advised that the amendments would be outside the scope of the bill. This is because the length of the local government term is not part of the bill’s single broad policy. (As previously noted, that policy is to provide an option to extend the term of Parliament to 4 years in certain circumstances.) Extending the 4-year term to local government would also require amendments to legislation that the bill as introduced does not propose to amend.

We acknowledge this advice. However, we are strongly of the view that the terms should align. We therefore think that, prior to a referendum being held, consideration should be given to aligning the term of local government with the term of Parliament.

Timing of the referendum

Clause 3(1)(b) of the bill as introduced provides that the legislation would be repealed if no referendum was conducted concurrently with either of the next 2 general elec-

tions held after the section commenced. If that subsection applied, the date of repeal would be 31 October 2031.

We note that, in principle, the Government has agreed that a referendum may be held alongside the next General Election in 2026 if the bill is enacted. It intends to confirm the exact timing of any referendum when the bill's progress is more certain.

We have not expressed a view as to whether the referendum should occur in 2026 or 2029. However, we wish to highlight two matters. First, we are currently considering the Electoral Amendment Bill, which would make a range of changes to the Electoral Act ahead of the 2026 General Election. We recognise that implementing the changes may affect the Electoral Commission's capacity to also administer the referendum in 2026. Second, we understand that the Government has committed to implementing an information programme for the term of Parliament referendum. Budget 2025 contains funding for the operational delivery of a referendum and a public information programme. We note that holding the referendum at the 2026 general election would create a very "small window" for a public education campaign. We encourage the Government to take both these matters into account when deciding the referendum date.

ACT New Zealand differing view

ACT supports the idea of moving to a 4-year parliamentary term only if stronger checks and balances are built into the system to prevent an erosion of democratic accountability. A longer term must not mean a stronger executive with less oversight.

ACT's position, as set out in our 2023 election policy and reflected in the National–ACT Coalition Agreement, was that any extension to the term must be conditional on a clear shift in the balance of power at select committees toward the opposition. This was not an ancillary detail. It was the essential safeguard that made a 4-year Parliament term worth considering. Without it, the bill falls short of the constitutional improvement New Zealanders deserve.

A first reading of this bill was secured in the National–ACT Coalition Agreement. Our original proposal, as referred to the Justice Committee, ensured:

- Select committees were proportionally based on non-executive membership of the House, giving the opposition greater influence and reducing the ability of the executive to dominate scrutiny.
- The change was approved by the public in a referendum.

While ACT acknowledges the issues raised by submitters in relation to legislating select committee proportionality, we do see it as an essential safeguard. It would ensure that a longer parliamentary term did not weaken oversight by:

- Increased the likelihood of opposition majorities on key subject select committees.
- Enabled more rigorous questioning of Ministers and officials, comparable to the success of the Opposition-chaired Epidemic Response Committee.
- Given voters a clear assurance that if the Government had more time between elections, Parliament would have more power to hold it to account.

Without this safeguard:

- A 4-year term risks concentrating too much power in the hands of the executive.
- The public may see the change as a self-serving move by politicians rather than a balanced reform, undermining confidence in the process and the referendum result.
- It removes the very protection that could have built long-term trust in a longer parliamentary term.

ACT believes in limited government, strong parliamentary oversight, and meaningful accountability. A 4-year term without stronger opposition powers at select committees tips the balance too far in favour of the Government of the day.

ACT proposed an amendment to the re-drafted bill which would have more simply tied the commencement of the bill to select committee composition. This amendment was not accepted by the committee.

For ACT, the proportionality requirement is not optional. It is the mechanism that would make a longer term acceptable to the public and credible as a constitutional improvement. Without it, the proposal fails to meet the standard of accountability that New Zealand's democracy requires.

Appendix

Committee process

The Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation Amendment Bill was referred to this committee on 5 March 2025. We called for submissions on the bill with a closing date of 17 April 2025. We received and considered submissions from 515 interested groups and individuals. We heard oral evidence from 43 submitters at hearings in Wellington and by videoconference. We wish to acknowledge the efforts of all submitters and thank them for their engagement.

Advice on the bill was provided by the Ministry of Justice. The Office of the Clerk provided advice on the bill's legislative quality and scope. The Parliamentary Counsel Office assisted with legal drafting.

Committee membership

Hon Andrew Bayly (member from 9 April and Chairperson from 10 April 2025)

Hon James Meager (member and Chairperson until 9 April 2025)

Hon Ginny Andersen

Jamie Arbuckle

Carl Bates

Tākuta Ferris

Dr Tracey McLellan (until 14 May 2025)

Rima Nakhle

Tom Rutherford

Todd Stephenson

Vanushi Walters (from 14 May 2025)

Hon Dr Duncan Webb

Dr Lawrence Xu-Nan

Related resources

The documents we received as advice and evidence are available on the Parliament website.

**Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation
Amendment Bill**

Key to symbols used in reprinted bill

As reported from a select committee

text inserted by a majority

~~text deleted by a majority~~

Hon Paul Goldsmith

Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation Amendment Bill

Government Bill

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The Parliament of New Zealand enacts as follows:

1 Title

This Act is the ~~Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation~~ Constitution (4-year Term of Parliament) Amendment Act 2025.

2 Commencement

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- (1) **Section 3** comes into force on the day after Royal assent.

- (2) The rest of this Act comes into force on the day of the issue of the writ for the first general election held after the date on which it is officially declared that the majority of electors voting in a referendum responded to the question specified in **subsection (3)** with ~~the affirmative~~ option 2 specified in **subsection (4)**. 5
- (3) The wording of the question to be put to electors in a referendum for the purposes of **subsection (2)** is—
~~“Do you support the Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation Amendment Act 2025 coming into force?”~~
“Which option do you vote for?” 10
- (4) The wording of the 2 options for which electors may vote in response to the question in **subsection (3)** is—
~~“Yes, I support the Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation Amendment Act 2025 coming into force.”~~
~~“No, I do not support the Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation Amendment Act 2025 coming into force.”~~ 15
Option 1
“I vote to keep the maximum term of Parliament at 3 years.”
Option 2
“I vote to change the maximum term of Parliament to 4 years.” 20
- (5) This section overrides any other enactment to the extent that the enactment specifies any wording of the question or the options for the referendum that is different from the wording in **subsections (3) and (4)**.
- (6) In this section and **section 3**, referendum—
- (a) means a referendum conducted concurrently with a general election that provides electors with an opportunity to ~~decide whether this Act should come into force~~ respond to the question in subsection (3); and 25
- (b) includes a fresh referendum required to be held if the High Court, on a petition, declares the referendum under **paragraph (a)** to be void.
- 3 Repeal** 30
- (1) This Act is repealed if—
- (a) a referendum is held and a majority of electors voting in the referendum responded to the question in **section 2(3)** with ~~the negative~~ option 1 in **section 2(4)**: 35
- (b) no referendum is conducted concurrently with either of the next 2 general elections that are held subsequent to the commencement of this section.
- (2) The date of repeal is,—

- (a) if **subsection (1)(a)** applies, the day that is 12 months after the date on which the result of the referendum is officially declared;
- (b) if **subsection (1)(b)** applies, 31 October 2031.

Part 1

~~Amendments~~ Amendment to Constitution Act 1986

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4 Principal Act

This Part amends the Constitution Act 1986.

5 Section 17 amended (Term of Parliament)

In section 17(1), replace “3” with “4”.

- (1) ~~Before section 17(1), insert:~~

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~~*Three year term of Parliament*~~

- (2) ~~Replace section 17(2) with:~~

~~*Four year term of Parliament*~~

- (2) ~~Despite **subsection (1)**, the term of a Parliament (unless it is sooner dissolved) is 4 years from the day fixed for the return of the writs issued for the last preceding general election of members of the House of Representatives, and no longer, if the Governor General, on the advice of the Prime Minister, issues a Proclamation declaring that the term of the Parliament is 4 years.~~

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- (3) ~~A Proclamation may be issued under **subsection (2)** only if the House of Representatives has, not later than 3 months after the day Parliament first meets after a general election, passed a resolution confirming that the proportionality requirement in **subsection (4)** is satisfied.~~

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- (4) ~~The proportionality requirement referred to in **subsection (3)** is that the membership of the subject select committees is such that the number of select committee memberships held by parties that have non-executive members is greater than the memberships held by parties that have executive members, determined by taking the following steps:~~

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- (a) ~~first, determining the number of seats in the House of Representatives held by the non-executive members (**the non-executive seats**); and~~

- (b) ~~second, determining the proportion of the non-executive seats held by the parties that have executive members and the proportion of the non-executive seats held by the parties that do not have executive members; and~~

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- (c) ~~third, applying each of the proportions calculated in **paragraph (b)** to the total membership of the subject select committees.~~

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Term of Parliament (Enabling 4-year Term) Legislation
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Example

~~There are 120 seats in the House of Representatives, 80 of which are held by non-executive members.~~

~~There are 3 parties that have executive members and collectively these parties hold 67 seats, of which 31 are executive members and 36 are non-executive members. These parties hold 36/80 (0.4045) of the non-executive seats in the House of Representatives.~~

~~There are 3 parties that have no executive members and collectively these parties hold 53 seats. These parties hold 53/80 (0.5955) of the non-executive seats in the House of Representatives.~~

~~The Business Committee has determined the size of each of the subject select committees with a resulting total membership across all committees of 110.~~

~~Applying the above ratios to the total membership of the subject select committees of 110 gives the following result:~~

- ~~• 44 members from parties that have executive members (110 x 0.4045 rounded to the nearest whole number); and~~
- ~~• 66 members from parties that have no executive members (110 x 0.5955 rounded to the nearest whole number).~~

~~In this case, the proportionality requirement is satisfied because the number of select committee memberships held by parties that have no executive members is greater than the memberships held by parties that have executive members.~~

~~(5) The issue of a Proclamation under **subsection (2)** must be as soon as is reasonably practicable after the resolution referred to in **subsection (3)** is passed by the House of Representatives.~~

~~(6) A 4 year term of a Parliament is not affected if, at any time after a Proclamation is issued under **subsection (2)**, the proportionality requirement in **subsection (4)** is not satisfied.~~

Definitions

~~(7) In this section, —~~

~~**executive member** means a member of Parliament who is a Minister or Parliamentary Under Secretary~~

~~**non-executive member** means a member of Parliament who is not a Minister or Parliamentary Under Secretary~~

~~**party** means a political party for the time being recognised as a party for parliamentary purposes in accordance with the rules and practice of the House of Representatives~~

~~**subject select committee** has the meaning set out in the rules and practice of the House of Representatives.~~

Guidance note

~~Under **section 268(1)(a)** of the Electoral Act 1993, section 17(1), **(2)** (so far as it relates to 4 years for a term of Parliament), and **(4)** are reserved provisions.~~

~~This means that these provisions cannot be repealed or amended unless the proposal for the repeal or amendment—~~

- ~~• is passed by a majority of 75% of all the members of the House of Representatives; or~~
- ~~• has been carried by a majority of the valid votes cast at a poll of the electors of the General and Maori electoral districts.~~

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Part 2

~~Amendments~~ Consequential amendment to Electoral Act 1993

6 Principal Act

This Part amends the Electoral Act 1993.

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7 Section 3B amended (Meaning of regulated period: general election)

In section 3B(5), definition of **default day**, replace “2” with “3”.

~~In section 3B(5), replace the definition of **default day** with:~~

~~**default day** means,—~~

- ~~(a) if the term of Parliament is 3 years, the day that is 2 years and 9 months after the polling day for the preceding general election;~~
- ~~(b) if the term of Parliament is 4 years, the day that is 3 years and 9 months after the polling day for the preceding general election~~

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8 ~~Section 268 amended (Restriction on amendment or repeal of certain provisions)~~

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~~Replace section 268(1)(a) with:~~

- ~~(a) the following provisions of the Constitution Act 1986:~~
 - ~~(i) section 17(1), relating of the term of Parliament;~~
 - ~~(ii) **section 17(2)**, so far as it relates to 4 years for a term of Parliament;~~
 - ~~(iii) **section 17(4)**, relating to the proportionality requirement for a 4 year term of Parliament;~~

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Legislative history

27 February 2025
5 March 2025

Introduction (Bill 128–1)
First reading and referral to Justice Committee